نظریه‌های متابعت دولت‌ها از حقوق بین‌الملل از منظر اقناع

نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 نویسنده مسئول،استاد دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی

2 دانشجوی دکتری حقوق بین‌الملل، دانشکده حقوق‌وعلوم‌سیاسی دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی

10.22066/cilamag.2019.35076

چکیده

مشهور است که دولت‌ها در بیشتر موارد به هنجارهای حقوق بین‌الملل احترام می‌گذارند. اما چرا علی‌رغم اینکه در نظام بین‌المللی، ساختار منسجم مرکزی برای تضمین اجرای حقوق بین‌الملل وجود ندارد، دولت‌ها به قواعد حقوق بین‌الملل احترام می‌گذارند؟ این مسئله مهمی است که اندیشمندان حوزه‌های حقوق بین‌الملل، علوم سیاسی و روابط بین‌الملل را به خود مشغول کرده است. از یک منظر، می‌توان سازِکارهای متابعت دولت‌ها از حقوق بین‌الملل را به سه دسته تقسیم‌بندی کرد: محاسبه هزینه و فایده، فرهنگ‌پذیری و اقناع. هریک از این سازوکارها به ­تنهایی قادر به توضیح علت متابعت دولت‌ها از حقوق بین‌الملل در همه موارد نیستند بلکه مکمل یکدیگرند. در این میان، سازِکار اقناع از اهمیت زیادی برخوردار است و نه‌تنها به‌صورت مستقل، بلکه از دریچه دو سازوکار دیگر، موجب متابعت دولت‌ها از حقوق بین‌الملل می‌شود.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Theories of States' Compliance with International Law:A Question of Persuasion

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohammadreza Ziaei Bigdeli 1
  • Hassan Bagherzadeh 2
1 Corresponding author, Professor of Law at the University of Allameh Tabatabaei
2 PhD candidate of public international law; university of Allameh Tabatabaei
چکیده [English]

It is a commonly held belief that States, almost all of the time, comply with the norms of international law. The international system lacks a central mechanism to ensure enforcement of international law, but why despite this fact, States do comply with the rules of international law? This is a peculiar question which has puzzled many thinkers in the fields of international relations and politics as well as international law. From a particular viewpoint, the issue of compliance of States with international law could be studied through three different mechanisms: cost and benefit analysis, acculturation, and persuasion. Each of these mechanisms in isolation is unable to describe the reason for which,in each case,States comply with international law; hence being complementary. Among these mechanisms, the role of persuasion is peculiar because this particular mechanism produces compliance with international law on its own and also through the other mechanisms.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • International Law
  • Compliance Theories
  • Cost and Benefit Analysis
  • Acculturation
  • persuasion
  • sanctions
  • Reputation
  • Managerial Model
  • Fairness Theory
  • Transnational Legal Process

الف. فارسی

ـ کتاب

  • تسون، فرناندو؛ فلسفه حقوق بین‌الملل، ترجمه: محسن محبی، چاپ سوم، شهر دانش، 1394.
  • فلسفی، هدایت‌الله؛ سیر عقل در منظومه حقوق بین‌الملل: اصول اساسی روش‌شناسی حقوق بین‌الملل، فرهنگ نشر نو، 1396.

 

ـ مقاله

  • میرفخرایی، سید حسن؛ «آنارشی و نظم از منظر نظریه‌های روابط بین‌الملل»، فصلنامه علمی تخصصی پژوهش‌های سیاسی، دوره 3، شماره 3، 8 پیاپی، زمستان 1392.

ب. انگلیسی

-Books

  • Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Palgrave, 2002.
  • Burgstaller, Markus. Theories of Compliance with International Law. Lieden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005.
  • Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995.
  • Ellickson, Robert C., Order without Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991.
  • Franck, Thomas M., Fairness in International Law and Institutions. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
  • ———The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
  • Guzman, Andrew T., How International Law Works. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
  • Henkin, Louis. How Nations Behave. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.
  • Tyler, Tom R., Why People Obey the Law. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.
  • Young, Oran. Compliance and Public Authority. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1979.

-Articles & Book Sections

  • Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. “On Compliance”. International Organization 47, no. 2, 1993.
  • Checkel, Jeffry T., “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change”. International Organization 55, no. 3, Summer 2001.
  • Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. “Is the Good News about Compliance the Good News about Cooperation”. International Organization 50, no. 3, 1996.
  • Franck, Thomas M., “Legitimacy in International System”. American Journal of International Law 82, no. 4, 1988.
  • Gibler, Douglas M., “The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 3, 2008.
  • Goodman, Ryan, and Derek Jinks. “How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law”. Duke Law Journal 54, no. 3, December 2004.
  • ———“Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty”. Stanford Law Review 55, 2003.
  • Guzman, Andrew T., “A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law”. California Law Review 90, 2002.
  • Johnston, Alastair Iain., “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments”. International Studies Quarterly 45, 2001.
  • Keohane, Robert O., “International Relations and International Law: Two Optics”. Chap. 6 In: Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World, 117-31. New York: Routledge, 2002.
  • Kingsbury, Benedict. “The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law”. Michigan Journal of International Law 19, 1998.
  • Koh, Harold Hongju. “1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home”. Houston Law Review 35, 1998.
  • ———“Internalization through Socialization”. Duke Law Journal 54, 2005.
  • ———“Transnational Legal Process”. Nebraska Law Revew 75 (1996).
  • ———“Why Do Nations Obey International Law”. The Yale Law Journal 106, no. 8, 1997.
  • Martin, Lisa L., “Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions”. World Politics, April 1993.
  • Neyer, Jurgen, and Dieter Wolf. “The Analysis of Compliance with International Rules: Definitions, Variables, and Methodology”. In: Law and Governance in Postnational Europe: Compliance Beyond the Nation-State, edited by Michael Zurn and Christian Joerges, 40-64. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
  • Onuma, Yasuaki. “International Law in and with International Politics: The Functions of International Law in International Society”. European Journal of International Law 14, no. 1, 2003.
  • Papillon, Terry L., “Socrates”. In: Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition: Communication from Ancient Times to the Information Age, edited by Theresa Enos, 680-81. New York: Routledge, 2011.
  • Raustiala, Kal. “Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation”. Case Western Journal of International Law 32, no. 2, 2000.
  • Raustiala, Kal, and Anne-Marrie Slaughter. “International Law, International Relations and Compliance”. In: Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, 538-58. London: Thousand Oaks, 2002.
  • Simmons, Beth A., “Compliance with International Agreements”. The Annual Review of Political Science 1, 1998.
  • ———“International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs”. American Political Science Review 94, no. 4, 2000.
  • Tallberg, Jonas. “Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the Europian Union”. International Organization 56, no. 3, Summer 2002.
  • Tallmon, James M. “Casuistry”. In: Encyclopedia of Rhetoric: (e-reference edition), edited by Thomas O. Sloane, 93-99: Oxford University Press, 2006.
  • Von Stein, Jana. “The Engines of Compliance”. In: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, edited by Jefferey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, 477-501. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
  • White, Nigel D., and Ademola Abass. “Countermeasures and Sanctions”. Chap. 16 In: International Law, edited by Malcolm D. Evans, 505-28. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

 

-Documents

  • Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries. International Law Commission, 2001.
  • International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), 1946, UNTS, vol. 161, p. 72, Reg. 2124.
  • Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, UNTS, vol. 1155, p. 331, Reg. 18232.