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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>مرکز امور حقوقی بین المللی ریاست جمهوری- مدیریت علمی و پژوهشی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مجله حقوقی بین المللی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-614X</Issn>
				<Volume>43</Volume>
				<Issue>شماره 81 (بهار)</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The 12-Day War and Destabilizing Actions of the United States and Israel against the Islamic Republic of Iran: Reflection from the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>جنگ ۱۲ روزه و اقدامات بی ثبات کننده ایالات متحده و رژیم صهیونی علیه جمهوری اسلامی ایران در آیینه رویه قضایی: با توجه به رویۀ دیوان بین‌المللی دادگستری</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>13</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>44</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">732139</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22066/cilamag.2025.2069632.2787</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>محسن</FirstName>
					<LastName>محبی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشیار دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، واحد علوم و تحقیقات، تهران، ایران</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0003-1555-8085</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>پریسا</FirstName>
					<LastName>عبدالهیان فرد</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشجوی دوره دکتری حقوق بین الملل، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، واحد علوم و تحقیقات، تهران، ایران</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>08</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Abstract&lt;br&gt;International responsibility arising from aggression, the threat of force, unilateral sanctions, and other destabilizing actions against a UN Member State constitutes one of the most challenging issues in contemporary international law. The actions of the United States and Israel against the Islamic Republic of Iran—particularly during the recent 12-day war (2025), through military threats, covert operations, unilateral sanctions, and the assassination of officials and scientists—have raised serious questions regarding the conflict of these actions with the principles of the UN Charter, territorial integrity, and the right of nations to self-determination. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international judicial bodies, including the International Criminal Court (ICC) and arbitral tribunals, have played a significant role in defining the scope of the prohibition on the use of force, the legitimacy of countermeasures, and the legal criteria for sanctions.&lt;br&gt;Focusing on judicial practice and individual opinions of judges, this article demonstrates that the actions of the United States and Israel against Iran conflict with the principle of the prohibition of the use of force (Article 2(4) of the Charter) and the prohibition of coercive economic pressure. An examination of recent rulings—including the separate opinion of Brazilian Judge Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade in the Iran v. United States case (2019) regarding the humanitarian consequences of sanctions; the dissenting opinion of Egyptian Judge Abdel Hamid Badawi in the Corfu Channel case (1949) concerning the violation of sovereignty; and the separate opinion of German Judge Bruno Simma in the Oil Platforms case (2003) regarding the restrictive interpretation of defensive measures—reveals the capacities and limitations of these judicial bodies. The article concludes that although judicial enforcement faces significant obstacles under current political conditions, the intelligent utilization of existing mechanisms, particula&lt;br&gt;rly through the analytical invocation of such individual opinions, can be effective in documenting responsibility, preventing the recurrence of violations, and shaping new customary rules.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">&lt;span lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;چکیده&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;مسئولیت بین‌المللی ناشی از تجاوز، تهدید به زور، تحریم‌های یکجانبه و سایر اقدامات بی‌ثبات‌کننده علیه یک دولت عضو سازمان ملل متحد، از چالش‌برانگیزترین مسائل حقوق بین‌الملل معاصر است. اقدامات ایالات متحده و اسرائیل علیه جمهوری اسلامی ایران، به‌ویژه در جنگ 12 روزة اخیر&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt; (2025) ا&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;ز طریق تهدیدهای نظامی، عملیات مخفیانه، تحریم‌های یکجانبه و ترور مقامات و دانشمندان، پرسش‌هایی جدی دربارة تعارض این اقدامات با اصول منشور ملل متحد، تمامیت سرزمینی و حق تعیین سرنوشت ملت‌ها مطرح کرده است. دیوان بین‌المللی دادگستری (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;LTR&quot; lang=&quot;EN-CA&quot;&gt;ICJ&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;) و سایر مراجع قضایی بین‌المللی، ازجمله &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;دیوان&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;کیفری بین‌المللی و دیوان‌های داوری، در تبیین حدود ممنوعیت توسل به زور، مشروعیت اقدامات متقابل و معیارهای قانونی تحریم‌ها نقش مهمی داشته‌اند.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;این مقاله با تمرکز بر رویه‌های قضایی و نظرات فردی قضات، نشان می‌دهد که اقدامات ایالات متحده و اسرائیل علیه ایران، با اصل منع توسل به زور&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt; (ماده &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;۲(۴) &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;منشور) &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;و با ممنوعیت فشار اقتصادی قهری در تعارض است. بررسی آرای اخیر، ازجمله نظر جداگانة قاضی برزیلی &lt;em&gt;آنتونیو اگوستو ترینداد&lt;/em&gt; در قضیة ایران و ایالات متحده&lt;span dir=&quot;LTR&quot;&gt;[1]&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;۲۰۱۹)،&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;دربارة پیامدهای انسانی تحریم‌ها، نظر مخالف قاضی مصری &lt;em&gt;عبدالحمید بوی پاشا&lt;/em&gt; در قضیة کانال کورفو&lt;span dir=&quot;LTR&quot;&gt;[2]&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;۱۹۴۹)، &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;در خصوص تجاوز به حاکمیت، و نظر جداگانة قاضی آلمانی &lt;em&gt;برونو سیما&lt;/em&gt; در قضیة سکوهای نفتی&lt;span dir=&quot;LTR&quot;&gt;[3]&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;۲۰۰۳)&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;دربارة تفسیر مضیق از اقدامات دفاعی، ظرفیت‌ها و محدودیت‌های این مراجع را آشکار می‌سازد. مقاله نتیجه می‌گیرد که هرچند ضمانت اجراهای قضایی در شرایط سیاسی موجود با موانع جدی روبه‌روست، بهره‌گیری هوشمندانه از سازکارهای موجود، به‌ویژه استناد تحلیلی به چنین نظرات فردی قضات، می‌تواند در مستندسازی مسئولیت، پیشگیری از تکرار نقض‌ها و تکوین قواعد عرفی جدید مؤثر باشد.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;واژگان کلیدی&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;دیوان بین‌المللی دادگستری، جنگ 12 روزه، تحریم‌های قهری، تجاوز، تهدید به زور، مسئولیت بین‌المللی، نظرات فردی قضات، جمهوری اسلامی ایران&lt;/span&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;br clear=&quot;all&quot;&gt;</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">دیوان بین‌المللی دادگستری</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">جنگ 12 روزه</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">تحریم‌های قهری</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">تجاوز</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">تهدید به زور</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">نظرات فردی قضات</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">جمهوری اسلامی ایران</Param>
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</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>مرکز امور حقوقی بین المللی ریاست جمهوری- مدیریت علمی و پژوهشی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مجله حقوقی بین المللی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-614X</Issn>
				<Volume>43</Volume>
				<Issue>شماره 81 (بهار)</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, emphasizing the US attack on Iran&#039;s nuclear facilities</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>منع حمله به تأسیسات هسته ای با تأکید بر حملۀ آمریکا به تأسیسات هسته ای ایران</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>45</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>72</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">733649</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22066/cilamag.2026.2067043.2760</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>ولی الله</FirstName>
					<LastName>نصیری</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشجوی دوره دکتری حقوق بین‌الملل دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی واحد مراغه، مراغه، ایران</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0001-5762-2167</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>صالح</FirstName>
					<LastName>رضایی پیش رباط</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشیار پژوهشگاه علوم و فنون هسته ای تهران، ایران</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>حجت</FirstName>
					<LastName>سلیمی ترکمانی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشیار گروه حقوق دانشگاه شهید مدنی آذربایجان، تبریز، ایران</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-2445-2453</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>07</Month>
					<Day>26</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;Given that preventing nuclear facilities from becoming battlefields during armed conflicts is very important and vital from the perspective of international law, the United States military attack on Iran&#039;s nuclear facilities raises serious questions about the clear violation of established international norms. This research, using a descriptive-analytical method and using documentary sources, seeks to answer this fundamental question: what is the legal status of the United States military attack on Iran&#039;s nuclear facilities within the framework of international law and whether the preemptive or preventive use of force can be considered as legitimate legal defense within the framework of customary and contractual international law? The results of the research show that in the absence of clear evidence of an imminent attack or authorization by the UN Security Council, the United States attack is an illegal and aggressive act. In addition, the US action is a clear example of unilateralism and a clear violation of the guarantee of implementation of the violation of safeguards provisions based on the collective security system. A system in which the Board of Governors is responsible for determining violations and violations of safeguards obligations, and the Security Council is responsible for determining the measures to be taken and how to apply penalties for violations of nuclear obligations.&lt;br&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;RTL&quot; lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">&lt;span dir=&quot;RTL&quot; lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;از آنجا که جمهوری اسلامی ایران در حال انجام مذاکرات هسته‌ای با ایالات متحدة امریکا بود، عملیات «چکش نیمه‌شب» (2025) ایالات متحده امریکا به دلیل ترکیب «جنگ و مذاکره» نه‌تنها حمله به تأسیسات تحت نظارت&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span dir=&quot;RTL&quot; lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی و نقض اصل منع توسل به زور محسوب می­شود، بلکه نقض آشکار مادۀ 26 عهدنامۀ وین و ماده 6 معاهدة منع گسترش سلاح­های هسته­ای یعنی مذاکرات توأم با حسن‌نیت نیز تلقی می­شود. با توجه به اینکه جلوگیری از تبدیل‌شدن تأسیسات هسته‌ای به­ عرصة نبرد از منظر حقوق بین­الملل بسیار مهم و حیاتی است، حملة نظامی ایالات متحدة امریکا به تأسیسات هسته‌ای ایران، پرسش‌های جدی در مورد نقض آشکار هنجارهای بین‌المللی تثبیت‌شده مطرح می‌کند. این تحقیق به ­دنبال پاسخ به این پرسش اساسی است که حملة نظامی ایالات متحده امریکا به تأسیسات هسته‌ای ایران در چارچوب قواعد حقوق بین­الملل چه وضعیت حقوقی داشته و آیا&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span dir=&quot;RTL&quot; lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;استناد به دفاع مشروع پیش­دستانه یا پیشگیرانه می‌تواند در چارچوب حقوق بین‌الملل عرفی و قراردادی قابل توجیه باشد؟ نتایج تحقیق نشان می­دهد که در صورت نبود شواهد روشن مبنی بر حملة قریب‌الوقوع یا مجوز شورای امنیت سازمان ملل، حملة ایالات متحدة امریکا اقدامی غیرقانونی و تجاوزکارانه است. به­علاوه اقدام امریکا مصداق بارز یکجانبه­گرایی و نقض آشکار ضمانت اجرای تخلف از مقررات پادمان مبتنی بر نظام امنیت دسته­جمعی است؛ نظامی که در آن، احراز تخلف و نقض تعهدات پادمانی بر عهدة شورای حکام و تعیین اقدامات اتخاذی و چگونگی اِعمال مجازات برای نقض تعهدات هسته­ای در صلاحیت شورای امنیت قرار دارد.&lt;/span&gt;</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">تأسیسات هسته‌ای</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">درگیری‌های مسلحانه</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">اصل منع توسل به زور</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">تجاوز</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">حقوق بین‌الملل بشردوستانه</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://www.cilamag.ir/article_733649_49ee157f7f43bc4ae3a4fd2326b7756e.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>مرکز امور حقوقی بین المللی ریاست جمهوری- مدیریت علمی و پژوهشی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مجله حقوقی بین المللی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-614X</Issn>
				<Volume>43</Volume>
				<Issue>شماره 81 (بهار)</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Targeted Assassination of Nuclear Scientists in Israel&#039;s Attack on Iran: A Challenge to Humanitarian Law</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>ترور هدفمند دانشمندان هسته ای در حمله اسراییل علیه ایران ؛ چالشی برای اصول حقوق بشردوستانه</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>73</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>93</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">732318</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22066/cilamag.2025.2070630.2809</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>شهرام</FirstName>
					<LastName>زرنشان</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشیار دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0003-0472-667X</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>محمد رضا</FirstName>
					<LastName>خاکپور</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشجوی دکتری حقوق بین‌الملل، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی همدان، همدان، ایران</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>10</Month>
					<Day>31</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;LTR&quot;&gt;Abstract&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;span dir=&quot;LTR&quot;&gt;Targeted Assassinations of Iranian Nuclear Scientists in Israeli Attacks Against Iran (June 2025) &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;A Study within the Framework of Customary International Humanitarian Law.&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span dir=&quot;LTR&quot;&gt;The targeted assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists in Israeli attacks against Iran in June 2025, as an emerging phenomenon in international relations, have created profound legal challenges in the interpretation and application of the customary rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Given the gaps in international judicial practice and the destructive effects of such actions on the stability of the international legal system, this research provides a comprehensive examination of this issue. &lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span dir=&quot;LTR&quot;&gt;The primary objective of this article is to conduct a holistic analysis of the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists within the framework of the customary international legal system, focusing on two fundamental pillars: &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;the principle of distinction between military and civilian objects &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;and &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;the principle of separation . &lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span dir=&quot;LTR&quot;&gt;Utilizing a &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;descriptive-analytical research method&lt;span&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;and relying on authoritative legal sources—including 1) the jurisprudence of international judicial bodies (International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court , 2) authoritative legal doctrines, 3) documents from international organizations, and 4) a comparative study of similar historical cases—this study concludes the following&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span dir=&quot;LTR&quot;&gt;Based on customary international law derived from judicial practice, &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;nuclear scientists, in the absence of direct and active participation in military operations, enjoy full protection as civilians. &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;Their targeted assassination, without adherence to the principles of distinction and separation, constitutes a &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gross violation of peremptory norms (jus cogens) of international law . International jurisprudence demonstrates that such acts entail &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;international criminal and civil responsibility &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;for the perpetrators and their sponsors. &lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span dir=&quot;LTR&quot;&gt;Based on the findings, this article concludes that the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, as an extrajudicial act falling outside the framework of customary international law, poses a &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;serious threat to the international legal order and collective security . Emphasizing the need to strengthen international monitoring mechanisms, this study proposes that &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;international bodies adopt practical measures, utilizing their authority, to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;LTR&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">ترورهای هدفمند دانشمندان هسته‌ای ایران در حمله اسراییل علیه ایران در ژوئن 2025 به عنوان پدیده‌ای نوظهور در عرصه مناسبات بین‌المللی، چالش‌های حقوقی عمیقی را در تفسیر و اجرای قواعد عرفی حقوق بین‌الملل بشردوستانه ایجاد نموده است. این پژوهش با توجه به خلأهای موجود در رویه قضایی بین‌المللی و آثار مخرب چنین اقداماتی بر ثبات نظام حقوقی بین‌الملل، به بررسی جامع این موضوع می‌پردازد. هدف اصلی این مقاله، تحلیل همه‌جانبه ترور دانشمندان هسته‌ای ایران در چارچوب نظام حقوق بین‌الملل عرفی با تمرکز بر سه محور اساسی شامل اصل تمایز بین اهداف نظامی و غیرنظامی واصل تفکیک و تناسب است. &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;براساس این مقاله نتیجه گیری می شود ترور دانشمندان هسته‌ای ایران نه تنها نقض فاحش حقوق بین‌الملل بشردوستانه است، بلکه تهدیدی جدی برای ثبات نظام بین‌المللی محسوب می‌شود. از دیدگاه حقوق بین‌الملل، ترور هدفمند دانشمندان هسته‌ای ایران در عملیات ژوئن ۲۰۲۵، فراتر از یک نقض متعارف، بیانگر یک چالش ساختاری عمیق‌تر برای کل نظام حقوقی حاکم بر حقوق بشر دوستانه و حقوق مخاصمات مسلحانه است. در هسته این چالش، تعارضی بنیادین بین یک تفسیر موسع و یک‌جانبه از «ضرورت امنیتی پیشدستانه» از یک سو، و چارچوب چندجانبه و قاعده مند حقوق بشردوستانه از سوی دیگر، قرار دارد .</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">حقوق بین‌الملل عرفی</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">اصل تمایز</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">ترور هدفمند</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">حقوق مخاصمات مسلحانه</Param>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>مرکز امور حقوقی بین المللی ریاست جمهوری- مدیریت علمی و پژوهشی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مجله حقوقی بین المللی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-614X</Issn>
				<Volume>43</Volume>
				<Issue>شماره 81 (بهار)</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The 12-Day War and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Aid or Assistance in the Commission of Aggression: An Analysis under Article 14 of the 2011 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>جنگ ۱۲ روزه و مساعدت آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی در ارتکاب تجاوز: تحلیلی ذیل ماده ۱۴ طرح مسئولیت سازمان‌های بین‌المللی ۲۰۱۱</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>95</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>124</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">731740</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22066/cilamag.2025.2070209.2802</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>سید محمدامین</FirstName>
					<LastName>علوی شهری</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشجوی دکتری حقوق تجارت و سرمایه‌گذاری بین‌المللی، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0009-0009-8430-045X</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>حوریه</FirstName>
					<LastName>حسینی اکبرنژاد</LastName>
<Affiliation>استادیار دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>08</Month>
					<Day>31</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;EN&quot;&gt;Abstract&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;span lang=&quot;EN&quot;&gt;The contradiction between the Israeli regime’s political exploitation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors’ Resolution GOV/2025/38 to justify its military aggression against Iran, and the subsequent statements by the Agency’s Director General which undermined the very basis of this justification, places the organization in a complex legal position. This situation raises the question, within the framework of international responsibility law, of whether the IAEA has effectively facilitated the Israeli regime’s commission of the act of aggression. Aiming to answer this question, this article analyzes the IAEA’s responsibility under Article 14 of the 2011 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO). The hypothesis is that the Agency’s responsibility is established due to its dual assistance (political and operational), its knowledge of the circumstances, and the violation of its own inherent obligations. The research is conducted using a qualitative method with a legal-doctrinal analysis approach. The findings indicate that by fulfilling the tripartite conditions of Article 14, the IAEA’s international responsibility for facilitating military aggression can be established.&lt;/span&gt;</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">&lt;span lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;چکیده&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;تضاد میان بهره‌برداری سیاسی رژیم اسرائیل از &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;قطعنامة شمارة &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;LTR&quot;&gt;GOV/2025/38&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;شورای حکام آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی برای توجیه تجاوز نظامی علیه ایران، و اظهارات متعاقب مدیرکل آژانس که اساس این توجیه را تضعیف می‌کرد، این نهاد را در موقعیت حقوقی پیچیده‌ای قرار می‌دهد. این وضعیت، این پرسش را در چارچوب حقوق مسئولیت بین‌المللی مطرح می‌کند که آیا آژانس عملاً ارتکاب عمل تجاوزکارانه توسط رژیم اسرائیل را تسهیل کرده است؟ این مقاله با هدف پاسخ به این پرسش، مسئولیت آژانس را ذیل ماده ۱۴ طرح مسئولیت سازمان‌های بین‌المللی ۲۰۱۱ تحلیل می‌کند. فرضیه آن است که مسئولیت آژانس به دلیل مساعدت دوگانه &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;(سیاسی و عملیاتی)&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;در ارتکاب عمل متخلفانة بین&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;LTR&quot;&gt;‌&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;المللی، علم به اوضاع و احوال، و نقض تعهدات ذاتی خود، محقق است. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهند که با احراز ارکان سه‌گانة ماده ۱۴، مسئولیت بین‌المللی آژانس در تسهیل تجاوز نظامی، قابل اثبات است.&lt;/span&gt;</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">مساعدت در عمل متخلفانه بین‌المللی</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">عمل تجاوزکارانه</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">ماده ۱۴ طرح مسئولیت سازمان‌های بین‌المللی</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">مراقبت مقتضی</Param>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>مرکز امور حقوقی بین المللی ریاست جمهوری- مدیریت علمی و پژوهشی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مجله حقوقی بین المللی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-614X</Issn>
				<Volume>43</Volume>
				<Issue>شماره 81 (بهار)</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>An Analysis of the Ineffectiveness of of the Legal Framework in Addressing the Crime of Aggression: An Exploration of the Evolution of the Concept of Aggression in International Criminal Law</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>تحلیلی بر ناکارآمدی نظام مقابله با تجاوز: کاوشی در تکامل مفهوم تجاوز در حقوق بین‌الملل کیفری</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>125</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>148</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">729663</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22066/cilamag.2025.2067930.2769</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>سید فضل الله</FirstName>
					<LastName>موسوی</LastName>
<Affiliation>استاد گروه حقوق عمومی دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>امیر</FirstName>
					<LastName>لهراسبی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشجوی دکتری حقوق بین‌الملل دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>08</Month>
					<Day>14</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span&gt;Abstract&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br&gt;In the third decade of the twenty-first century, international criminal law faces fundamental challenges in addressing the crime of aggression. While aggression is regarded as the gravest threat to international peace and security, in practice it remains deprived of effective deterrence and accountability due to conceptual ambiguities and structural limitations. The central problem of this study lies in explaining the inherent paradox between the normative status of aggression at the apex of international crimes and the practical ineffectiveness of its prosecution and enforcement of criminal responsibility. The research hypothesis suggests that unlawful uses of force may fall within the framework of crimes against humanity, and that such a reconceptualization—grounded in the theory of convergence between the law on the use of force (jus ad bellum) and international humanitarian law (jus in bello)—can address existing gaps and mitigate the dominance of politics over law. The findings—derived from a descriptive-analytical methodology and based on library sources—demonstrate that although the definition adopted in General Assembly Resolution 3314 marked an important normative step, the political compromises underlying its drafting produced serious ambiguities and rendered it a flexible instrument in the hands of the Security Council. Consequently, the predominance of realist state-centered approaches has undermined accountability, while the limited jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court has perpetuated the immunity of senior officials. Nevertheless, linking aggression both conceptually and operationally with crimes against humanity, and applying the principles of necessity and proportionality within the convergence of these two branches of international law, provides a promising pathway for strengthening the prospects of criminal prosecution. Moreover, the expansion of non-judicial accountability mechanisms, as complements to judicial institutions, offers the potential to foster normative consensus and enhance the effectiveness of international justice in responding to aggression.&lt;/span&gt;</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;در دهة سوم قرن بیست‌ویکم، نظام حقوق بین‌الملل کیفری با چالش‌های بنیادین در مواجهه با جرم تجاوز روبه‌رو است. مسئلة تجاوز در حالی به‌عنوان شدیدترین تهدید علیه صلح و امنیت بین‌المللی شناخته می‌شود که در عمل به‌واسطة ابهامات و محدودیت‌های ساختاری، فاقد بازدارندگی و پاسخگویی مؤثر کنشگران بین‌المللی است. مسئلة اصلی این پژوهش، تبیین این تناقض بنیادین میان جایگاه هنجاری تجاوز در سلسله‌مراتب جرایم بین‌المللی و ناکارآمدی عملی آن در عرصة پیگرد و تحقق مسئولیت کیفری است. بر پایة فرضیة تحقیق، توسل غیرقانونی به زور، قابلیت آن را دارد که ذیل چارچوب جنایات علیه بشریت مورد پیگرد قرار گیرد که با اتکا به نظریة همگرایی قواعد حقوق توسل به زور و حقوق جنگ، امکان رفع خلأهای موجود و تعدیل غلبة سیاست بر حقوق را فراهم می‌آورد. یافته‌های تحقیق نشان می‌دهد تعریف ارائه‌شده در قطعنامة &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;۳۳۱۴&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;مجمع عمومی هرچند دستاورد هنجاری مهمی بود، مصالحه‌های سیاسی در فرآیند تدوین آن، ابهامات جدی ایجاد کرده و به ابزاری انعطاف‌پذیر در دست شورای امنیت بدل ساخته است. بر همین اساس، سلطة رویکرد واقع‌گرایانة دولت‌ها، تحقق پاسخگویی را تضعیف کرده و صلاحیت محدود دیوان کیفری بین‌المللی نیز به تداوم مصونیت مقامات عالی‌رتبه یاری رسانده است. با وجود این، پیوند مفهومی و عملی جرم تجاوز با جنایات علیه بشریت و بهره‌گیری از اصول ضرورت و تناسب در چارچوب همگرایی نظامی دو شاخة حقوقی، چشم‌اندازی کارآمد برای ارتقای قابلیت پیگرد فراهم می‌کند. افزون بر این، گسترش سازوکارهای غیرقضایی به‌عنوان مکمل نظام قضایی می‌تواند زمینه‌ساز تقویت اجماع هنجاری و ارتقای کارآمدی عدالت بین‌المللی در مقابله با تجاوز شود. &lt;/span&gt;</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">تجاوز</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">توسل به زور</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">حقوق بین‌الملل کیفری</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">حقوق جنگ</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">حقوق مخاصمات مسلحانه</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">دفاع مشروع</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://www.cilamag.ir/article_729663_9a07c99c3cbccbc9f2190c7ee2121c68.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>مرکز امور حقوقی بین المللی ریاست جمهوری- مدیریت علمی و پژوهشی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مجله حقوقی بین المللی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-614X</Issn>
				<Volume>43</Volume>
				<Issue>شماره 81 (بهار)</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Countermeasure Against an International Organization: The Legitimacy of Iran’s Suspension of Cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>اقدام متقابل علیه سازمان بین‌المللی: مشروعیت تعلیق همکاری ایران با آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>149</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>178</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">730937</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22066/cilamag.2025.2070550.2805</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>مهدی</FirstName>
					<LastName>حدادی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشیار دانشکدگان فارابی دانشگاه تهران</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-1618-5017</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>09</Month>
					<Day>01</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;span&gt;After Israel’s aggression against Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the United States’ attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran was required by a law passed by the parliament to suspend cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Previously, Iran had limited or suspended some of its cooperation with the Agency in some cases. The Iranian government claims that the Agency and the Director General of this organization have not fulfilled their duties and obligations regarding these attacks. In particular, the Director General has always adopted a politicized, selective, and discriminatory approach towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. The research question is whether, in relations between Iran and Agency, suspension of cooperation under the guise of countermeasure is legitimate. The results of this research show that, taking into account specific conditions, it is possible to resort to countermeasure against the organization for its violations. However, resorting to countermeasure requires a special permit regarding violations of obligations arising from the rules of organization, and internal organizational mechanisms have priority&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;پس از تجاوز اسرائیل به حاکمیت و تمامیت سرزمینی ایران و نیز حملة ایالات متحدة امریکا به تأسیسات هسته‌ای ایران، دولت جمهوری اسلامی ایران بر اساس قانون مصوبة مجلس، ملزم به تعلیق همکاری با آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی شد. پیش از این نیز در مواردی ایران برخی همکاری‌های خود را با آژانس، محدود یا تعلیق کرده بود. ادعای دولت ایران این است که آژانس و نیز مدیرکل این سازمان به وظایف و تعهدات خود در خصوص این حملات عمل نکرده‌اند. به‌ویژه مدیرکل، همواره رویکردی سیاست‌زده، گزینشی و تبعیض‌آمیز نسبت به جمهوری اسلامی ایران در پیش گرفته است. س&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;FA&quot;&gt;ؤ&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;ال پژوهش این است که آیا در روابط بین ایران با آژانس، تعلیق همکاری تحت عنوان اقدام متقابل از مشروعیت برخوردار است؟ نتایج این پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که با لحاظ شرایط خاص، امکان توسل به اقدام متقابل علیه سازمان در برابر تخلفاتش وجود دارد، اگرچه در خصوص نقض تعهدات ناشی از قواعد سازمان، توسل به اقدام متقابل نیازمند مجوز خاص است و ساز&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span lang=&quot;AR-SA&quot;&gt;وکارهای درون‌سازمانی اولویت دارد.&lt;/span&gt;</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">آژانس بین المللی انرژی اتمی</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">مسئولیت بین المللی</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">اقدام متقابل</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://www.cilamag.ir/article_730937_51954d309c1275ec142a91794680a8d7.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>مرکز امور حقوقی بین المللی ریاست جمهوری- مدیریت علمی و پژوهشی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مجله حقوقی بین المللی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-614X</Issn>
				<Volume>43</Volume>
				<Issue>شماره 81 (بهار)</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Armed Attack on (Military) Nuclear Programs; A New Exception to the Prohibition of the Use of Force?</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Armed Attack on (Military) Nuclear Programs; A New Exception to the Prohibition of the Use of Force?</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>231</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>258</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">733542</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22066/cilamag.2026.2072557.2827</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Siamak</FirstName>
					<LastName>Karimi</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor at Shahid Beheshti University</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-9129-0335</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>09</Month>
					<Day>23</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>To date, the world has witnessed five instances of the use of force against &lt;span lang=&quot;EN-GB&quot;&gt;States&lt;/span&gt;&#039; nuclear programs: the U.S. response to the Cuban missile crisis (1962), Israel&#039;s attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor (1981), the coalition States’ military strike on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction program (2003), Israel’s attack on the Al-Kibar in Syria (2007), and most recently, the June 2025 Israeli attack—carried out in cooperation with the United States—on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The attacking States claimed that their actions were justified on the basis that the nuclear programs of the targeted States, having&lt;span lang=&quot;EN-GB&quot;&gt; allegedly&lt;/span&gt; deviated toward military purposes, had become an existential threat. Regardless of the accuracy of such claims, can the deviation of a State’s nuclear program from peaceful purposes—and even the acquisition of nuclear weapons—be considered &lt;em&gt;per se&lt;/em&gt; a threat to international peace and security, capable of justifying a preemptive attack aimed at destroying or halting that program? This article examines existing State practice and, the ICJ’s case law to conclude that although the formerly consistent State practice rejecting such attacks has fragmented, the current divergence among States does not yet permit the emergence of a new exception to the peremptory norm of the prohibition of the use of force.&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">To date, the world has witnessed five instances of the use of force against &lt;span lang=&quot;EN-GB&quot;&gt;States&lt;/span&gt;&#039; nuclear programs: the U.S. response to the Cuban missile crisis (1962), Israel&#039;s attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor (1981), the coalition States’ military strike on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction program (2003), Israel’s attack on the Al-Kibar in Syria (2007), and most recently, the June 2025 Israeli attack—carried out in cooperation with the United States—on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The attacking States claimed that their actions were justified on the basis that the nuclear programs of the targeted States, having&lt;span lang=&quot;EN-GB&quot;&gt; allegedly&lt;/span&gt; deviated toward military purposes, had become an existential threat. Regardless of the accuracy of such claims, can the deviation of a State’s nuclear program from peaceful purposes—and even the acquisition of nuclear weapons—be considered &lt;em&gt;per se&lt;/em&gt; a threat to international peace and security, capable of justifying a preemptive attack aimed at destroying or halting that program? This article examines existing State practice and, the ICJ’s case law to conclude that although the formerly consistent State practice rejecting such attacks has fragmented, the current divergence among States does not yet permit the emergence of a new exception to the peremptory norm of the prohibition of the use of force.&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Use of Force</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">self-defence</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Nuclear Program</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Customary International Law</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Existential Threat</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://www.cilamag.ir/article_733542_618465700e1da8d425479fd404079f8e.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>مرکز امور حقوقی بین المللی ریاست جمهوری- مدیریت علمی و پژوهشی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مجله حقوقی بین المللی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-614X</Issn>
				<Volume>43</Volume>
				<Issue>شماره 81 (بهار)</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Redefining the Legitimacy of Military Interventions in Contemporary Conflicts: The Role of the ICJ and Global Institutions in the June 2025 Israel’s Attack on Iran</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Redefining the Legitimacy of Military Interventions in Contemporary Conflicts: The Role of the ICJ and Global Institutions in the June 2025 Israel’s Attack on Iran</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>259</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>277</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">729332</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22066/cilamag.2025.2068423.2774</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Farid</FirstName>
					<LastName>Fathi</LastName>
<Affiliation>LL.M. Candidate in International Law, Faculty of Law, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0009-0004-5633-4322</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>08</Month>
					<Day>10</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>This study reconsiders the normative boundaries of legitimate military intervention through the lens of the recent twelve-day international armed conflict between Iran and Israel and the controversial involvement of the United States Or in a more legal sense, the twelve-day armed aggression of Israel and United States of America against Islamic Republic of Iran. The central research questions ask: The central idea of the present research is to find an appropriate answer to the question of whether existing international legal frameworks, including the UN Charter, customary international law, and ICJ jurisprudence, can sustain their regulatory authority over state conduct in asymmetric conflicts. Moreover, can interventions that are justified as anticipatory or collective self-defense be reconciled with the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter?&lt;br&gt;The hypothesis posits that existing legal instruments inadequately address the realities of contemporary conflicts, where political expediency often eclipses legal restraints. Adopting a doctrinal and case-based methodology, the present article examines relevant ICJ cases, UN records, and state practice. It finds a growing divergence between legality and legitimacy, revealing an urgent need to redefine intervention standards through enforceable norms and coherent adjudication.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">This study reconsiders the normative boundaries of legitimate military intervention through the lens of the recent twelve-day international armed conflict between Iran and Israel and the controversial involvement of the United States Or in a more legal sense, the twelve-day armed aggression of Israel and United States of America against Islamic Republic of Iran. The central research questions ask: The central idea of the present research is to find an appropriate answer to the question of whether existing international legal frameworks, including the UN Charter, customary international law, and ICJ jurisprudence, can sustain their regulatory authority over state conduct in asymmetric conflicts. Moreover, can interventions that are justified as anticipatory or collective self-defense be reconciled with the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter?&lt;br&gt;The hypothesis posits that existing legal instruments inadequately address the realities of contemporary conflicts, where political expediency often eclipses legal restraints. Adopting a doctrinal and case-based methodology, the present article examines relevant ICJ cases, UN records, and state practice. It finds a growing divergence between legality and legitimacy, revealing an urgent need to redefine intervention standards through enforceable norms and coherent adjudication.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Use of force, legitimacy, self-defense, Israel&amp;‌‌‌‌‌rsquo</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">s Armed Aggression against Iran, ICJ, U.S. intervention, anticipatory defense, Article 2(4), UN Charter, Global Legal Order</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://www.cilamag.ir/article_729332_af293eadcc0ac994ff17ca94efafadca.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>مرکز امور حقوقی بین المللی ریاست جمهوری- مدیریت علمی و پژوهشی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مجله حقوقی بین المللی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-614X</Issn>
				<Volume>43</Volume>
				<Issue>شماره 81 (بهار)</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The Rough jurisdiction of the ICC with regard to Israel&#039;s aggression against Iran (13 June, 2025)</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>The Rough jurisdiction of the ICC with regard to Israel&#039;s aggression against Iran (13 June, 2025)</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>279</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>301</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">733730</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22066/cilamag.2026.2069842.2797</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mahdi Reza</FirstName>
					<LastName>Sadeghi</LastName>
<Affiliation>Ph.D in International Law, Visiting Lecturer at the Department of Law in Jahrom University and Judge of the Court of Justice.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-9178-145X</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>08</Month>
					<Day>25</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>The extensive aerial operation and armed attack by Israel against Iran on the 23rd Khordad 1404 [corresponding to June 13, 2025] may be characterized as a violation of the fundamental principle prohibiting the use of force, constituting an act and crime of aggression. Beyond other legal dimensions of the act of aggression, the purpose of this article is to examine the complex issue of the possible jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) over the alleged committed crime, as well as the jurisdictional challenges facing this institution. While Iran&#039;s legal system lacks an appropriate normative and structural mechanism for applying complementarity jurisdiction concerning core international crimes, including the crime of aggression, the non-membership of both Iran and Israel in the ICC, the lack of willingness by Security Council (SC) to refer the situation to the ICC, and normative deficiencies regarding the acceptance of ad hoc declaration ( per article 12(3) of the Rome Statute) by Iran, render the ICC&#039;s exercise of jurisdiction difficult and even impossible. A question can be raised in this regard, does the ICC possess jurisdiction, pursuant to the principle of complementarity, to adjudicate upon the act of aggression committed by Israel against Iran? This article, after recounting the events, descriptively and analytically examines the possibility of the ICC exercising jurisdiction in light of trigger mechanism. Ultimately, it demonstrates that the ICC&#039;s jurisdiction is confronted with numerous and particular challenges, thus rendering it unable to exercise jurisdiction; an issue that both highlights the necessity of criminalizing core international crimes within domestic law of Iran, and indicates the fundamental reforms to the ICC&#039;s Statute, particularly concerning the role of the SC in activating the ICC&#039;s jurisdiction.&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">The extensive aerial operation and armed attack by Israel against Iran on the 23rd Khordad 1404 [corresponding to June 13, 2025] may be characterized as a violation of the fundamental principle prohibiting the use of force, constituting an act and crime of aggression. Beyond other legal dimensions of the act of aggression, the purpose of this article is to examine the complex issue of the possible jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) over the alleged committed crime, as well as the jurisdictional challenges facing this institution. While Iran&#039;s legal system lacks an appropriate normative and structural mechanism for applying complementarity jurisdiction concerning core international crimes, including the crime of aggression, the non-membership of both Iran and Israel in the ICC, the lack of willingness by Security Council (SC) to refer the situation to the ICC, and normative deficiencies regarding the acceptance of ad hoc declaration ( per article 12(3) of the Rome Statute) by Iran, render the ICC&#039;s exercise of jurisdiction difficult and even impossible. A question can be raised in this regard, does the ICC possess jurisdiction, pursuant to the principle of complementarity, to adjudicate upon the act of aggression committed by Israel against Iran? This article, after recounting the events, descriptively and analytically examines the possibility of the ICC exercising jurisdiction in light of trigger mechanism. Ultimately, it demonstrates that the ICC&#039;s jurisdiction is confronted with numerous and particular challenges, thus rendering it unable to exercise jurisdiction; an issue that both highlights the necessity of criminalizing core international crimes within domestic law of Iran, and indicates the fundamental reforms to the ICC&#039;s Statute, particularly concerning the role of the SC in activating the ICC&#039;s jurisdiction.&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Israel aggression</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Iran</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">ICC</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">complementarity jurisdiction</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Security Council</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://www.cilamag.ir/article_733730_84f32b6ef06505f2f9569b8dc75cb62a.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>مرکز امور حقوقی بین المللی ریاست جمهوری- مدیریت علمی و پژوهشی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مجله حقوقی بین المللی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-614X</Issn>
				<Volume>43</Volume>
				<Issue>شماره 81 (بهار)</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Weapons of Legal Justification: The Pretext of Preemptive Self-Defence in the Israeli Strikes Against Iran</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Weapons of Legal Justification: The Pretext of Preemptive Self-Defence in the Israeli Strikes Against Iran</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>303</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>334</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">730083</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22066/cilamag.2025.2066512.2767</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Anosh</FirstName>
					<LastName>Naderi</LastName>
<Affiliation>PhD. Student, Research and Casual Academic, University of Technology Sydney</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-6143-1168</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>08</Month>
					<Day>01</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;span lang=&quot;EN-AU&quot;&gt;This article critically evaluates the legality of pre-emptive self-defence under contemporary international law, focusing specifically on Israel’s June 2025 airstrikes against Iran. By analyzing the legal framework established by Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, the central argument contends that pre-emptive force remains unlawful absent an actual armed attack. However, an incremental accumulation of scholarships and national military manuals, primarily limited to certain western States, has fostered a self-referential cycle. This cycle projects the misleading appearance of an emerging customary norm authorizing pre-emptive or preventive use of force. This doctrinal ‘snowball effect’, whereby successive publications uncritically cite and amplify predecessors, generates an artificial sense of legal evolution. Nevertheless, rigorous analysis drawing on doctrine, International Court of Justice jurisprudence, general practice of States and even the &lt;em&gt;Caroline&lt;/em&gt; criteria itself, often invoked by States justifying pre-emptive self-defence, reveals a clear distinction: lawful self-defence is strictly confined by necessity and proportionality, while anticipatory or preventive self-defence falls outside accepted legal boundaries. The article concludes that Israel’s justification, based on non-imminent and speculative threats, fails to meet even the lower threshold of the &lt;em&gt;Caroline&lt;/em&gt; doctrine for pre-emptory self-defence – let alone the stricter contemporary &lt;em&gt;jus ad bellum&lt;/em&gt; standards under the UN Charter. Recognizing a unilateral right to pre-emption would gravely undermine the &lt;em&gt;jus cogens&lt;/em&gt; character of Article 2(4), erode the UN’s collective security system, and incentivize destabilizing unilateral initiatives and resorts to force. Consequently, absent Security Council authorization or a manifest armed attack, pre-emptive self-defence remains fundamentally incompatible with the current international legal order.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">&lt;span lang=&quot;EN-AU&quot;&gt;This article critically evaluates the legality of pre-emptive self-defence under contemporary international law, focusing specifically on Israel’s June 2025 airstrikes against Iran. By analyzing the legal framework established by Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, the central argument contends that pre-emptive force remains unlawful absent an actual armed attack. However, an incremental accumulation of scholarships and national military manuals, primarily limited to certain western States, has fostered a self-referential cycle. This cycle projects the misleading appearance of an emerging customary norm authorizing pre-emptive or preventive use of force. This doctrinal ‘snowball effect’, whereby successive publications uncritically cite and amplify predecessors, generates an artificial sense of legal evolution. Nevertheless, rigorous analysis drawing on doctrine, International Court of Justice jurisprudence, general practice of States and even the &lt;em&gt;Caroline&lt;/em&gt; criteria itself, often invoked by States justifying pre-emptive self-defence, reveals a clear distinction: lawful self-defence is strictly confined by necessity and proportionality, while anticipatory or preventive self-defence falls outside accepted legal boundaries. The article concludes that Israel’s justification, based on non-imminent and speculative threats, fails to meet even the lower threshold of the &lt;em&gt;Caroline&lt;/em&gt; doctrine for pre-emptory self-defence – let alone the stricter contemporary &lt;em&gt;jus ad bellum&lt;/em&gt; standards under the UN Charter. Recognizing a unilateral right to pre-emption would gravely undermine the &lt;em&gt;jus cogens&lt;/em&gt; character of Article 2(4), erode the UN’s collective security system, and incentivize destabilizing unilateral initiatives and resorts to force. Consequently, absent Security Council authorization or a manifest armed attack, pre-emptive self-defence remains fundamentally incompatible with the current international legal order.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Article 51</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Caroline Doctrine</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">International Law</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Jus ad bellum</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Pre-emptive Self-Defence</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">self-defence</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">UN Charter</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://www.cilamag.ir/article_730083_4230e2a0896f19416dc2fa599a339079.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>مرکز امور حقوقی بین المللی ریاست جمهوری- مدیریت علمی و پژوهشی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مجله حقوقی بین المللی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-614X</Issn>
				<Volume>43</Volume>
				<Issue>شماره 81 (بهار)</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Legitimacy Assessment of the June 2025 Attacks by the United States and Israel Against Iran&#039;s Nuclear Facilities in Light of International Law</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Legitimacy Assessment of the June 2025 Attacks by the United States and Israel Against Iran&#039;s Nuclear Facilities in Light of International Law</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>335</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>356</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">733545</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22066/cilamag.2026.2069703.2791</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mahdi</FirstName>
					<LastName>Firoozabadian</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Prof., Department of Law, ToH. C., Islamic Azad University, Torbat Heydarieh, Iran.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0001-9443-7366</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Faramarz</FirstName>
					<LastName>Yadegarian</LastName>
<Affiliation>M.A. in International Law, Department of International Law, SR. C., Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-4561-4669</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>08</Month>
					<Day>23</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>In June 2025, the U.S and Israel took extensive military action against Iran which resulted in inflicting severe damage on country’s infrastructure. The primary question of the research is, from the standpoint of international law, whether the actions of Israel and United States of America were legitimate, and what legal response does Iran have. The hypothesis of the research is based on the premise that the aforementioned attacks are illegal and constitute multiple violations of international law, neither falling within the framework of legitimate self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter nor within the framework of anticipatory self-defense. According to the Caroline doctrine, Iran was not planning to attack at any level whether at initial stages or other levels therefore the imminence of self-defense would lose its function and there was no practical and immediate threat against Israel. Therefore, Israel&#039;s attack in the form of preventive self-defense also lacked legal legitimacy and constituted military aggression. This research was conducted using a descriptive-analytical method and library document review. The findings indicate the attacks constitute a clear violation of Article 56 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions 1977, which prohibits attacks on installations containing dangerous materials, Articles 35 and 55 regarding prohibition of environmental destruction, Article 85(3)(c) which considers such attacks as war crimes, violation of the principle of distinction between military and civilian targets by attacking targets such as the Evin Prison and numerous hospitals, Article 8(2)(b)(4) of the Rome Statute, and Article 2 of the UN Charter regarding peaceful settlement of disputes, while Iran was engaged in negotiations. The article&#039;s findings prove that Iran can file complaints based on violations of established principles of international law if the U.S and Israel accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, and can also pursue justice through Declaration under Article 12(3) of the ICC and other legal remedies, as the practice of the ICC shows that its judicial policy regarding issuing arrest warrants for heads of state has undergone significant developments</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">In June 2025, the U.S and Israel took extensive military action against Iran which resulted in inflicting severe damage on country’s infrastructure. The primary question of the research is, from the standpoint of international law, whether the actions of Israel and United States of America were legitimate, and what legal response does Iran have. The hypothesis of the research is based on the premise that the aforementioned attacks are illegal and constitute multiple violations of international law, neither falling within the framework of legitimate self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter nor within the framework of anticipatory self-defense. According to the Caroline doctrine, Iran was not planning to attack at any level whether at initial stages or other levels therefore the imminence of self-defense would lose its function and there was no practical and immediate threat against Israel. Therefore, Israel&#039;s attack in the form of preventive self-defense also lacked legal legitimacy and constituted military aggression. This research was conducted using a descriptive-analytical method and library document review. The findings indicate the attacks constitute a clear violation of Article 56 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions 1977, which prohibits attacks on installations containing dangerous materials, Articles 35 and 55 regarding prohibition of environmental destruction, Article 85(3)(c) which considers such attacks as war crimes, violation of the principle of distinction between military and civilian targets by attacking targets such as the Evin Prison and numerous hospitals, Article 8(2)(b)(4) of the Rome Statute, and Article 2 of the UN Charter regarding peaceful settlement of disputes, while Iran was engaged in negotiations. The article&#039;s findings prove that Iran can file complaints based on violations of established principles of international law if the U.S and Israel accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, and can also pursue justice through Declaration under Article 12(3) of the ICC and other legal remedies, as the practice of the ICC shows that its judicial policy regarding issuing arrest warrants for heads of state has undergone significant developments</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">Caroline Doctrine</Param>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>مرکز امور حقوقی بین المللی ریاست جمهوری- مدیریت علمی و پژوهشی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مجله حقوقی بین المللی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-614X</Issn>
				<Volume>43</Volume>
				<Issue>شماره 81 (بهار)</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>From Symbolism to War Crime: Legal Analysis of the Evin Prison Attack under International Humanitarian Law</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>From Symbolism to War Crime: Legal Analysis of the Evin Prison Attack under International Humanitarian Law</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>357</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>385</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">733543</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22066/cilamag.2026.2071811.2825</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mahin</FirstName>
					<LastName>Sobhani</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Guilan, Rasht, Iran</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-5871-6242</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Amirmasoud</FirstName>
					<LastName>Pourmousa</LastName>
<Affiliation>M.A. in Criminal Law &amp; Criminology, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Guilan, Rasht, Iran.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0009-0004-0550-300X</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>09</Month>
					<Day>16</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>In June 2025, Israeli airstrikes on Evin Prison in Tehran killed more than 80 civilians, including detainees, staff, and visiting family members. The attack provoked strong international condemnation, notably from France, due to its civilian toll and the absence of a credible military justification. The present article examines the strike&#039;s legality under international humanitarian law (IHL), with particular emphasis on the principles of distinction and proportionality as codified in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Using a descriptive-analytical approach, this paper argues that the Evin attack lacked a legitimate military objective and violated the fundamental requirement of Article 48 to distinguish between civilian and military targets. Israel’s claim of “symbolic” intent falls short of IHL standards and highlights the absence of lawful military necessity. While detention facilities may, in some contexts, be misused as human shields, no such justification existed in this case. The strike appears politically and psychologically motivated, potentially amounting to acts of terror against civilians. In accordance with Article 8 of the Rome Statute and relevant IHL instruments, the attack constitutes a war crime due to breaching the principles of proportionality and distinction. Rigorous legal analysis and comprehensive documentation are essential to advancing individual criminal responsibility, including through mechanisms such as universal jurisdiction.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">In June 2025, Israeli airstrikes on Evin Prison in Tehran killed more than 80 civilians, including detainees, staff, and visiting family members. The attack provoked strong international condemnation, notably from France, due to its civilian toll and the absence of a credible military justification. The present article examines the strike&#039;s legality under international humanitarian law (IHL), with particular emphasis on the principles of distinction and proportionality as codified in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Using a descriptive-analytical approach, this paper argues that the Evin attack lacked a legitimate military objective and violated the fundamental requirement of Article 48 to distinguish between civilian and military targets. Israel’s claim of “symbolic” intent falls short of IHL standards and highlights the absence of lawful military necessity. While detention facilities may, in some contexts, be misused as human shields, no such justification existed in this case. The strike appears politically and psychologically motivated, potentially amounting to acts of terror against civilians. In accordance with Article 8 of the Rome Statute and relevant IHL instruments, the attack constitutes a war crime due to breaching the principles of proportionality and distinction. Rigorous legal analysis and comprehensive documentation are essential to advancing individual criminal responsibility, including through mechanisms such as universal jurisdiction.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">Evin Prison</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">Principle of Distinction</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">principle of proportionality</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Symbolic Attacks</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">Iran&amp;‌‌‌‌‌‌ndash</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">Israel Conflict</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">International Humanitarian Law (IHL)</Param>
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