Legal Framework of WTO from the Perspective of Game Theory in International Law

Document Type : academic

Authors

1 Department of law, najafabad branch, Islamic Azad university, najafabade

2 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Isfahan

Abstract

Game theory in international law is one of the innovative perspectives in the field of philosophy of international law. The disinctive nature of this perspective is that instead of merely theorizing, it has a goal to explain international rules and structure in a logical and practical manner. In 1944, in the field of economy, this theory was proposed for the first time by von Neumann, a mathematician, in partnership with Morgenstern, an economist. But since then, it has gradually entered into other academic fields such as international relations, sociology, etc. In recent years, for the first time in international law, two great researchers namely Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, applying this theory, have explained the manner of formation and due respect of international customs. In international law, this issue has been considered as a new approach and has successfully drawn attention to its own. In this article, it has been tried to analyze the legal framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) from the perspective of this theory. It is believedthat our findings in terms of game theory help researchers to understand the framework of that organization more easily.The research methodology used in this article is analytical. For this purpose, the required rules from game theory are introduced and briefly explained and then from the perspective of what was said, we will survey a number of items and agreements from the total collection of WTO and will prove a logical stand that will be applicable to the whole legal framework of WTO.

Keywords


  • منابع:

    الف. فارسی

    ـ کتاب

    • اندریاس اف.لونفلد؛ حقوق بین‌الملل اقتصادی، ترجمه: محمد حبیبی مجنده، چاپ دوم، جنگل، 1392.
    • موسوی زنوز، موسی؛ تحول حقوق تجارت بین‌الملل در سازمان جهانی تجارت، میزان، 1392.

     

    ـ مقاله

    • امید‌بخش، اسفندیار؛ از موافقت‌نامه عمومی تعرفه و تجارت تا سازمان جهانی تجارت، سازمان جهانی تجارت، ساختار، قواعد و موافقت‌نامه‌ها، دفتر نمایندگی تام‌الاختیار تجاری ج.ا.ا، شرکت چاپ و نشر بازرگانی، 1389.
    • دژم‌خوی، غزاله؛ نظام حل‌و‌فصل اختلافات در سازمان جهانی تجارت، سازمان جهانی تجارت، ساختار، قواعد و موافقت‌نامه‌ها، دفتر نمایندگی تام‌الاختیار تجاری ج.ا.ا، شرکت چاپ و نشر بازرگانی، 1389.
    • روحانی، حامد؛ نظام یارانه‌ها و اقدامات جبرانی در سازمان جهانی تجارت، سازمان جهانی تجارت، ساختار، قواعد و موافقت‌نامه‌ها، دفتر نمایندگی تام‌الاختیار تجاری ج.ا.ا، شرکت چاپ و نشر بازرگانی، 1389.

     

    ب. انگلیسی

    - Books

    • Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (5th ED.1789) University of Chicago Press, Edwin Cannan, ED, 1976.
    • Bernard M. Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization, Law, Economics and Politics, Routledge, First Published, 2007.
    • Drew Fundenberg, Game Theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Forth Printing, 1995.
    • Fiona Carmichael, A Guide to Game Theory, Pearson Education Limited, First Published, 2005.
    • Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2005.
    • John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, ISBN: 069110613, 60th Anniversary Edition 20,1944.
    • Irwin, DA, Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade, Princeton University Press, 1996.
    • Nicolas F. Diebold, Non-Discrimination in International Trade in Services, Likeness in WTO/GATS, Cambridge University Press, First Published, 2010.
    • Peter van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of World Trade Organization, Text, Cases And Materials, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
    • World Trade Organization, The WTO Multilateral Trade Agreements, WTO E-Learning, 2010.
    • World Trade Organization, Exploring the Links between Subsidies, Trade and WTO, World Trade Report, 2006.

     

    – Articles

    • Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance Based Theory of International Law, California Law Review, vol. 90, Issue. 6, 2002.
    • Anne van Aaken, “To Do Away with International Law? Some Limits to the Limits of International Law”, EJIL, vol.17, No. 12, 2006.
    • Boris Rigord, “The Purpose of The WTO Agreement on Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures”, EJIL, vol. 24, No. 2, 2013.
    • Detlev F. Vagts, “International Relations Looks at Customary International Law: A Traditionalists Defense”, 15 EJIL, 1031, 2004.
    • Colin B. Picker, “Regional Trade Agreements v. the WTO: A Proposal for Reform of Article XXIV to Counter to this Institutional Threat”, 26 U Penn. J. Intl. Econ. l 267, 2005.
    • Eric A. Posner, “Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law”, 55 Stanford Law Review, 2003.
    • Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, “The Role of Reciprocity in International Law”, Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 36, Art 4, 2003.
    • Hector Correa, “Game Theory as Instrument for the Analysis of International Relation”, The Ritsumeikhan Journal of International Studies, 2001.
    • Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, “A Theory of International Customary International Law”, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev.1113, 1999.
    • Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, Further Thoughts onCustomary International Law, 23 Mich. J.Int., l7, 191, 2001.
    • Jens David Ohlin, “Nash Equilibrium and International Law”, EJIL, vol. 23, No. 4, 2012.
    • Joosth H. B. Pauwelyn, “The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How can We Go?” American Journal of International Law, vol. 95, 2001.
    • Mathias Herzing, “A Prisoner's Dilemma Tariff Setting Game with an Escape Clause”, Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, August 2003.
    • Mansfield, Edward & Eric Reinhardt, “Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effect of GATT/WTO on Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements”, International Organization, vol. 57, Issue 4, 2003.
    • Meredith Kolsky Lewis, “The Prisoners Dilemma Posed by Free Trade Agreement: Can Open Access Provisions Provide an Escape”, Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 11, No. 2, 2011.
    • Niels Petersen, “How Rational is International Law”, EJIL, vol. 20, 2010.
    • Pascal Lamy, “The Place of the WTO and Its Law in the International Legal Order”, EJIl, vol. 17, No. 5, 2007.

     

    - Jurisprudence

    • Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS121/AB/R, 14 December 1999.
    • Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, Report of Panel, WT/DS 46/R/14 April 1999.
    • Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive in Industry, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS 139/AB/R, WT/DS/142/AB/R, 31 May 2000.
    • Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Report Of Panel, WT/DS 70/R, 14 April 1999.
    • Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of Appellate Body, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 4 October 1996.
    • Japan-Trade in Semi Conductors, Report of Panel, L/6309-35S/116, Adopted 4 May 1988213/AB/A, 4 November 1988.
    • Korea - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, Report of the Panel, WT/DS273/R, 7 March 2005.
    • Turkey-Restriction on Import of Textile and Clothing Product, Report of The Panel, WT/DS 34/R, 31 may 1999.
    • United States-Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany, report of panel, WT/DS 213/AB/R, 28 November 2002.
    • United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS166/Ab/R, 22 December 2000.
    • United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Quality Line Pipe from Korea, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS 202/AB/R, 15 February 2002.
    • United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, Report of the Panel, L/6175 - 34s/136, Adopted on 17 June 1987.