تحدید زمان و قلمرو شمول: گامی به سوی انسانی‌کردن تحریم‌ها

نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار دانشکده علوم انسانی دانشگاه هرمزگان

چکیده

ازآنجاکه اعمال تحریم‌های گسترده، کل جمعیت کشور مورد تحریم را هدف قرار می‌دهد، برای مردم، به‌ویژه اقشار ضعیف جامعه، مشکلات فراوانی ایجاد می‌کند. یکی از راهکارهای کاهش اثرات منفی تحریم‌ها به‌ویژه تحریم‌های گسترده، تحدید زمان و قلمرو شمول تحریم است. به بیان دیگر، ایجاد محدودیت زمانی و نیز محدودیت در گستره تحریم از جنبه‌های عینی و شخصی، راه را به سوی انسانی‌کردن تحریم‌ها هموار خواهد کرد. دلیل گنجاندن چنین محدودیت‌هایی در تحریم، آن است که اثرات منفی آن نباید گریبان‌گیر کسانی شود که در رفتار یا سیاستی که علت وضع تحریم بوده است، هیچ‌گونه نقشی نداشته‌اند. این قاعده از اصل تفکیک (تمایز) در حقوق بین‌الملل بشردوستانه نشأت گرفته است و بر اساس آن، تحریم باید در حد متعارف، متضمن حداکثر تفکیک میان افراد مسئول و مردم عادی باشد. بدیهی است رعایت این اصل در زمینه تحریم، در صورتی موفقیت‌آمیز خواهد بود که کارآمدی تحریم بر مبنای مشروعیت بین‌المللی آن و با اتکا به همکاری وسیع کشورها و سازمان‌های بین‌المللی در اجرای تحریم به همراه ارزیابی مستمر آثار آن بر مردم کشور هدف (مورد تحریم)، تضمین شود. در مقاله حاضر، مفهوم، طبقه‌بندی و چگونگی گنجاندن قیدهای محدودکننده و تأثیر این سازوکارها بر تقویت ابعاد انسانی تحریم‌ها و مصون‌نگاهداشتن مردم عادی از اثرات منفی آن‌ها، بررسی می‌‌شود.
 

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Limitation of Time and Scope: A Step towards the Humanization of Sanctions

نویسنده [English]

  • Mansour Farrokhi
چکیده [English]

The imposition of comprehensive sanctions by targeting the whole population in a sanctioned State causes a wide range of problems for the people and particularly the weak groups of society. To limit the time and the scope of sanctions is a method to reduce negative consequences of sanctions, specifically comprehensive ones. In other words, determining time limits as well as objective and subjective limitations for sanctions will pave the way to the humanization of sanctions. The reason for the inclusion of the abovementioned limitations is that the people who have no role in the conduct or the policy triggering sanctions, should not bear the negative consequences thereof. This rule stems from the international humanitarian law principle of distinction according to which sanctions should reasonably involve the maximum distinction between the responsible elites and ordinary people. Evidently, the compliance of this principle will only be successful when the efficiency of sanctions program is guaranteed on the basis of its international legitimacy and relying on widespread cooperation among States and international organizations during the implementation of sanctions along with continuous evaluation of their effects on the people of the targeted State. In the present essay, the notion, classification, the inclusion of limitation clauses and the effects of those mechanisms strengthening the humanitarian aspects of sanction will be studied. 

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • sanctions
  • Suspension of Sanctions
  • Time-limited Sanctions
  • Targeted Sanctions
  • Smart Sanctions
  • Humanitarian Exemption Clause

 

- Articles

  • Andreas, Peter, “Criminalizing, Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy”, International Studies Quarterly (2005), http://www.ceu.hu/polsci/Illicit-Trade.
  • Brabant, Koenraad Van, “Can Sanctions be Smarter? The Current Debate”, Overseas Development Institute, Report of the Conference Held in London, 16-17 December 1998, available at www. seco. admin. ch/themen/html
  • Brzoska, Michael “Measuring the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes”, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 14 (2), (2008): article 2.
  • Craven, Matthew, “Humanitarianism and the Quest for Smarter Sanctions”, European Journal of International Law (EJIL), vol. 13, No. 1, (2002).
  • Davidson, Elias, “The Mechanism of Economic Sanctions: Changing Perceptions and Euphemisms”, March 2002 (Rev. November 2003), available at www.aldeilis.net/english/attachments/2877-econsanc-debate. pdf.
  • Drezner, Daniel W., “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice”, International Studies Review 13, (2011).
  • Fitzgerald, Peter L, “Managing Smart Sanctions against Terrorism Wisely”, New England Law Review 36, (2002).
  • Geiss, Robin, “Humanitarian Safeguards in Economic Sanctions Regime: A Call for Automatic Suspension Clauses, Periodic Monitoring, and Follow-Up Assessment of Long-Term Effects”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 18, Spring 2005.
  • Kochler, Hans (Ed) “Economic Sanctions and Development, Introductory Remarks”, International Progress Organization, Studies in International Relations, vol. XXIII, Vienna (1997), http://www.i-p-o.org.
  • Kroft, Steve “Unlikely Terrorists on No Fly List, CBS 60 Minutes, (June 7, 2007), at: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/05/60minutes/ main2066624. shtml.
  • Lennon, Shuna, “Sanctions, Genocide and War Crimes”, A Paper Presented to the International Law Association on 29 February 2000, at http://www.zmag.org/crisescurEvts/Iraq/Sanctions.htm.
  • Magnusson, Finner, “Targeted Sanctions and Accountability of the United Nations Security Council”, University of Vienna, Faculty of Law, June 2008, available at www.ils.univie.ac.at/. . . /user. . . /SC_ Terrorist.
  • Manchak, Benjamine, “Comprehensive Economic Sanctions, the Right to Development, and Constitutionally Impermissible Violations of International Law”, Third World Law Journal, Boston College, Volume 30/Issue 2, 2010, available at www. lawdigitalcommons. bc. edu/twlj/vol30/iss2/7
  • Marks, Stephen, “The Human Rights to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Issue 17, spring 2004, at http://www. law. harvard. edu.
  • Pantuliano, Sara et al, “Counter-terrorism and Humanitarian Action”, HPG Policy Brief 43, (Humanitarian Policy Group), October 2011, available at www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/7347.pdf.
  • Paul, James A., “Sixteen Policy Recommendations on Sanctions”, Proposed at a forum of German Parliamentarians in Bonn, global policy forum, 31 March 1998, at http://www.globalpolicyorg/Security /Sanctions/ jpreccs.Htm.
  • Peksen, Dursun, “Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights”, Journal of Peace Research 46 (1), (2009).
  • Rennack, Dianne E. and Robert D. Shuey, “Sudan: Economic Sanctions”, CRS Report for Congress. October 2005, available at: www.fpc.state. gov/documents/organization/55628.pdf.
  • Shagabutdinova, Ella and Jeffrey berejikian, “Deploying Sanctions While Protecting Human Rights: Are Humanitarian Smart Sanctions Effective?” Journal of Human Rights 6, (2007).
  • Sponeck, Hans-c Von, “Iraq Sanctions: What Options Did UN Security Council Have?” Paper Presented in the Hiroshima Peace Institute (2006), The Brussels Tribunal, at: http://brusselstribunal. Org/ sponecksanctions. htm.
  • Sponeck, H. C. Graf, “Sanctions and Humanitarian Exemptions: A Practitioner`s Commentary”, European Journal of International Law (EJIL), vol. 13, No. 1. (2002).
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  • Tostensen, Arne & Beate Bull, “Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?” World Politics 54, April 2002.

 

- Documents and Regulations

  • Declaration on the Basic Conditions Standard Criteria for the Introduction and Implementation of Sanction and Other Coercive Measures: Revised Working Paper, U. N. GAOR, Special Comment on the Charter of the U.N. and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, U. N. Doc A/Ac. 182/L. 114/Rev. (2004).
  • Effects of the Security Council Sanctions on the Health Situation of the Population of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, UN Doc. S/ 1994/ 506 (1994). ol. 13, No. 1. (2002).
  • Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, UN. GAOR, 51st Seas. 128, U. N. Doc. A/51/ 306 (1996).
  • Report of the Second Panel Established Pursuant to the Current Humanitarian Situation in Iraq. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess. 58 UN. Doc. S/ 1999/ 356 (1999).
  • Comprehensive Iran Sanction, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), available at: <http://www.treasury.gov>.
  • Joint Plan of Action, Iran & E3/EU+3, Geneva, November 24, 2013.
  • S/Res/ 253 (1968)
  • S/Res /986 (1995)
  • S/Res/1022 (1995)
  • S/ Res/1298 (2000)
  • S/Res/ 1306 (2000)
  • S/Res/1333 (2000)
  • S/Res/1425 (2002)
  • S/Res. 1737 (2006)
  • S/Res/1904 (2009)
  • S/Res/1970 (2011)
  • The Bank of England Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets (Full List),http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/financialsanctions/sanctionsconlist.htm.
  • The U. N. Consolidated List of Individuals and Entities Belonging to or Associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaida Organization as Established and Maintained by the 1267 Committee, at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ committees/1267/tablelist. htm.
  • The UN Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee, General Comment 8 (1997), “The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” 12 December 1997, at para. 4, UN Doc. HRI/ GEN/ 1/ Rev. 6, 12 May 2003.
  • The UN Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee, General Comment 12 (1999) “The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11)”, 12 May 1999, at para. 37, UN Doc. HRI/ GEN/ 1/ Rev. 6, 12 May 2003.