مشروعیت دکترین «هر جا، هر زمان، دسترسی مدیریت‌‌شده» در حقوق بین‌الملل هسته‌ای

نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی

نویسنده

دکتری حقوق بین‌الملل، پژوهشگر دانشگاه حقوق‌وعلوم‌سیاسی چین

10.22066/cilamag.2019.92764.1572

چکیده

این مقاله محدودیت‌های ناشی از حاکمیت قانون را بر سیستم راستی‌آزمایی آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی هسته‌‌ای در کشورهای عضو معاهده ان.پی.تی بررسی می­کند. یکی از مهم‌‌‌‌ترین وظایف آژانس، راستی‌آزمایی و بررسی پایبندی کشورهای فاقد سلاح اتمی به تعهدات بین‌المللی هسته‌‌ای خود، ازجمله عدم انحراف فعالیت‌های هسته‌ای اعلام­شده و فقدان فعالیت‌های اعلام‌نشدة هسته‌‌ای است. هدف نهایی نظام بازرسی کنترل تسلیحات، حصول اطمینان از ماهیت منحصراً صلح‌آمیز فعالیت‌های هسته‌‌ای کشورهای عضو است. برای دستیابی به چنین هدفی، نه نیازی به نقض حاکمیت یک کشور و نه استفاده از زور علیه برنامه هسته‌‌ای آن کشور است. از نظر حقوق بین‌الملل، دکترین «هر جا، هر زمان، دسترسی مدیریت‌شده» می‌تواند صلح و امنیت جهانی را در درازمدت به مخاطره اندازد و حتی تمایل کشورها را برای تولید سلاح اتمی به‌عنوان ابزار بازدارنده در مقابل تهدیدات قدرت‌های جهانی افزایش دهد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Legitimacy of the Doctrine “Anywhere Anytime Managed Access” in International Law

نویسنده [English]

  • Hedayatollah Shenasaei
PhD in International Law
چکیده [English]

This article seeks to examine the constraints arising from the “rule of law” over the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification system within the NNWS. One of the main tasks of the IAEA as an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization is to verify non-nuclear weapon states’ compliance with their international obligations, including the non-diversion of declared nuclear materials and absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The ultimate aim of the arms control inspection system is to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear activities of countries. In order to achieve this goal, it does not need either the violation of a country’s sovereignty or the use of force against its nuclear program. From the perspective of international law, the doctrine “anywhere anytime managed access” can jeopardize the maintenance of international peace and security in the long run and increase the willingness of countries to develop nuclear weapons as deterrent against the threats of global powers.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • verification
  • IAEA’s Inspection Scope
  • Unlimited Access
  • JCPOA’s Obligations
  • Section T
الف. فارسی

ـ کتاب

ممتاز، جمشید و ؛ حقوق بین‌الملل، سلاح‌های کشتار‌ جمعی، ترجمه و تحقیق: امیرحسین رنجبریان، میزان، 1390.

 

ـ مقاله

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