The Evolution of the Use of Force in Peacekeeping Operations

Extended Abstract:

In recent years, we have witnessed a new type of operation called robust peacekeeping, which has expanded the scope of self - defense and, consequently, the right to use of force. Instead of expanding the scope of the right to use force, these types of operations have moved far away from traditional peacekeeping operations and have become closer to peace enforcement operations. However, how peacekeeping operations have moved towards increasing their similarity to peace enforcement operations and what factors have caused this are among the issues that this article, by collecting library data on the issues under discussion, examines. It has been studied using a descriptive - analytical method. By examining the course of these developments, it was concluded that in recent missions, the basic principles of peacekeeping (impartiality, consent of the parties, non-use of force) have been questioned, because the missions of recent years are carried out much differently than the traditional missions. UN peacekeeping missions established before 1960 initially had a non-combat role, with the task of monitoring, reporting to the Security Council and facilitating dialogue between the warring parties, and the scope of the use of force was very limited. However, with the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) from 1960 to 1964, the scope of self-defence was somewhat expanded to include the defence of UN posts, premises and vehicles under armed attack, as well as the protection of other mission personnel in Cyprus who were under armed attack. About ten years later, with the establishment of The Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) (1973-1979), the scope of self defence was further expanded. This included the use of force to prevent interference in the execution of peacekeeping operations (defence of the mandate). But even this limitation of scope could not prevent the Rwandan and Srebrenica massacres in the 1990s, where UN peacekeepers failed to stop widespread human rights violations. The weakness and slow response of UN peacekeeping forces have been heavily criticized by the international community. Since then, the international community has increasingly demanded that peacekeeping forces be able to protect civilians. In March 2000, Secretary - General Kofi Annan established a High - Level Panel to review the current UN peacekeeping structures and make recommendations. The High - Level Panels findings led to the Brahimi Report in August 2000. The Brahimi report repeatedly emphasized learning from past peace operations and called for the deployment of “Robust peacekeeping.” The Brahimi Report called for larger, better equipped, and more aggressive forces. The Robust peacekeeping has also increased dramatically since the Brahimi Report. In March 2013, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2098, which established The Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The FIB is the first ever offensive operation in the history of the United Nations to use all necessary means to neutralize and disarm armed groups in the Congo. While the FIB seems like a suitable solution to the problem, this offensive combat unit contradicts the essence of peacekeeping and jeopardizes the legitimacy of the United Nations. While the FIB appears to be a suitable solution to the problem, this offensive combat unit contradicts the essence of peacekeeping and undermines the legitimacy of the United Nations. The FIB has significantly changed the nature of peacekeeping operations. It is impossible to reconcile the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the FIB with the principles of peacekeeping, even taking into account the developments in the use of force in peacekeeping operations in the authoritative guidelines. Such unprecedented involvement in hostilities clearly demonstrates that this type of mission can in no way be considered impartial, since it fights alongside the Government and against some of the belligerents involved in the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Accordingly, the stabilization mission in the Congo must be considered a party to the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and must apply international humanitarian law.

The evolution that the two principles of non-use of force and consent of the host State have undergone has had a significant impact on the character of the third principle, impartiality. It is no longer thought that peacekeepers are prohibited from taking sides in a conflict under any circumstances. This flexibility in the fundamental principles is possible because peacekeeping operations are not constrained by the UN Charter, and this has allowed peace operations to evolve and respond effectively to inherently diverse mission locations. The flexible nature of peacekeeping operations can be positively assessed, as each mission can be shaped based on the needs of the region and the goals that the international community wants. But what about the fact that despite this degree of flexibility, Robust peacekeeping have been more effective in establishing peace in the mission area than traditional peacekeeping .It is necessary to distinguish between the short - term and long-term objectives of missions. For example, the action of all military components in United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the FIB, achieved some important immediate objectives, such as the defeat of the March 23 armed group by the FIB. However, in the long term, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has proven to be unable to neutralize all the armed groups that destabilize the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Instead, these groups are still active, and several years after the deployment of the FIB, the human rights and security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo remains unstable.