1. Introduction

At dawn on 13 June 2025, the international security landscape witnessed a complex legal-political crisis with the Israeli regime’s large-scale military aggression against Iran’s nuclear facilities. This act, justified under the doctrine of “existential threat,” posed an unprecedented challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, the complexity extended beyond the mere use of force; the political instrumentalization of a technical document from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) made the situation considerably more intricate. Israeli officials leveraged the Board of Governors’ Resolution GOV/2025/38, adopted just one day before the attack, as a pretext to provide diplomatic cover and justification for their military action. This enigma assumed a more serious dimension when subsequent statements by the IAEA Director General, denying evidence of a systematic Iranian move towards a nuclear weapon, effectively invalidated Israel’s security rationale. This stark contradiction between the political exploitation of the Agency’s outputs and the Director General’s later remarks places the international body in a highly sensitive legal position.

2. Research Problem

The aforementioned events raise a fundamental question within the framework of international responsibility law: Has the IAEA, through its actions and outputs, effectively aided or assisted the Israeli regime in committing the wrongful act of aggression, thereby incurring international responsibility? This issue is significant as it highlights the perilous intersection of a technical international organization’s functions and the political realities of the international arena. Superficially, the IAEA acted within its statutory mandate; however, the immediate and direct exploitation of its work—the Board of Governors’ resolution and technical reports—to facilitate an internationally wrongful act raises serious ambiguities regarding the organization’s responsibility. This research seeks to resolve these ambiguities. Its importance lies in clarifying the scope of responsibility for international organizations when their actions, even indirectly, contribute to a state’s violation of peremptory norms (jus cogens). Answering this question is vital not only for this specific case but also for the future of global governance and for preventing institutions established to preserve peace from becoming instruments that facilitate war.

3. Methodology

This research is structured using a qualitative research method with a legal-doctrinal analysis approach. To answer the research questions, it employs a content analysis of international legal instruments, jurisprudence, and the doctrine of international law.

4. Key Findings

Applying the legal framework of Article 14 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO) to the events reveals that all necessary elements for establishing the IAEA’s responsibility are met.

A) The Commission of a Principal Wrongful Act: The first condition for complicity is the commission of an “internationally wrongful act” by the principal actor. Israel’s military attack on Iran is a manifest violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and constitutes an “act of aggression” under General Assembly Resolution 3314. Potential justifications like “pre-emptive self-defense” lack legal validity, given the restrictive criteria in international practice and ICJ jurisprudence (e.g., Nicaragua Case). Thus, the first element—the commission of a wrongful act by Israel—is fully established.

B) The Element of “Aid or Assistance”: The IAEA facilitated the aggression through two distinct but complementary means:

1. Political Assistance: The adoption of Resolution GOV/2025/38 by the Board of Governors, just one day before the attack, provided Israel with a powerful political tool to lend a veneer of international legitimacy to its military action. Regardless of its technical content, the resolution was interpreted and exploited as a diplomatic “green light” in a tense political context, significantly impacting the decision to attack.

2. Operational Assistance: The IAEA’s detailed technical reports on the location and activities of Iran’s nuclear facilities, though prepared under its safeguards duties, were used as a precise source of intelligence for military targeting. This assistance was not marginal and directly contributed to the operational effectiveness of the aggression.

C) Knowledge of the Circumstances: The IAEA cannot claim ignorance of the likely consequences of its actions. Repeated public threats by Israeli officials, the historical precedent of the 1981 Osirak attack, and the highly militarized regional environment provided sufficient evidence for the Agency’s “knowledge,” or at least “constructive knowledge,” that its outputs would be misused for military purposes. The principle of due diligence required the Agency to consider this foreseeable risk.

D) The Wrongfulness of the Aid for the Organization Itself: The final condition of Article 14 is that the assistance would be wrongful if committed by the organization itself. The IAEA’s facilitation of aggression violates its own fundamental obligations. According to the IAEA Statute’s preamble, the organization must promote “peace, health and prosperity” and ensure its assistance is not used “to further any military purpose.” Facilitating an act of aggression directly opposes these commitments, fulfilling this final element.

5. Contribution to the Field

This research contributes to the existing body of knowledge in international law in several ways. First, it is one of the first legal analyses to apply the theoretical framework of “responsibility of international organizations for aid or assistance” (Article 14 of the 2011 DARIO) to a complex, real-world scenario in international security. Second, by analyzing the concept of “dual assistance” (political and operational), it enriches the legal doctrine regarding the forms and threshold of “significant” aid. Third, by highlighting the role of due diligence in assessing the responsibility of technical organizations, this research argues that such bodies cannot evade the foreseeable political and security consequences of their actions by invoking the technical nature of their duties. This contributes to the development of responsibility in global governance. Fourth, this article exposes a gap in the international accountability regime and underscores the necessity of establishing effective mechanisms to address claims by states against international organizations.

6. Implications and Applications

The findings have significant theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, this study emphasizes the need for a teleological interpretation of the obligations of international organizations, meaning technical duties must always be implemented in light of the ultimate goals of the international community, particularly the maintenance of peace and security. Practically, this article serves as a serious warning to international organizations and their member states to act with greater caution and responsibility in crisis situations. These findings could form the basis for developing operational guidelines within international organizations to prevent the misuse of their technical outputs for military purposes. Furthermore, injured states can use this legal analysis as a basis for formulating claims of responsibility against international organizations in diplomatic or legal forums.

7. Conclusion

This research has demonstrated that with all four constituent elements of Article 14 of DARIO being met, the international responsibility of the IAEA for facilitating Israel’s military aggression against Iran is established. This conclusion, extending beyond a specific case, reveals a structural dilemma in global governance: the dangerous intersection of technical functions and political realities. If the international legal system cannot provide a clear and effective response to this dilemma, there is a risk that organizations established to preserve peace may unwittingly become instruments for facilitating war. By highlighting this lacuna, this article underscores the necessity of revising procedures and strengthening accountability mechanisms to preserve the credibility and efficacy of the international legal system in the 21st century.