The right to life is one of the most fundamental human rights, protected in many international instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This right allows every individual to be protected from violence and the threat of death. One of the most serious threats to the right to life in the history of human life has been war or military aggression. The relationship between the right to war and the human right to life will be examined in this article.

This article is a type of developmental research that collects data using a combined (descriptive-analytical) method and using library and Internet documents. The methodology is the analysis of the content of international documents on the the right to life in thejus ad bellum.

In the contemporary world, if a war is initiated unlawfully under international law, it can have serious consequences for human rights, including the threat to the right to life of thousands of innocent people. Accordingly, in recent years we have witnessed that human rights organizations have adopted a different approach regarding the issue of war and military aggression, working to maximize the protection of fundamental human rights, particularly the right to life during conflicts or military aggression. Among the significant actions in this regard is General Comment No. 36 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights concerning the right to life, which clearly and decisively establishes a link between human life and the concept of military aggression, thereby delineating important obligations for states.

The first criticism is the lack of extraterritorial application of human rights obligations. In response to this criticism, it has been argued that human rights obligations imply that states' support for human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals is not limited to their territorial boundaries; rather, states also bear responsibility for human rights violations of individuals outside their own territory. However, it must be acknowledged that even if the extraterritorial application of international human rights law is generally accepted, military aggression still presents certain ambiguities and specific legal dilemmas in this regard. One important question is whether it can be said that potential victims of aggression fall under the jurisdiction of the aggressor before the aggressor has physical control over the individuals or territories belonging to them. The case law of the European Court does not offer a promising perspective on the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations of states during wartime. While armed conflicts in recent years and the clear, widespread violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by warring states outside their territorial boundaries have underscored the importance of the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations, particularly in the context of war, this is an undeniable and significant reality.

The second objection is the exclusive application of the laws of war and the lack of ability to invoke human rights law in situations of resorting to force. In response, similar to the relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law, there is no evidence in the texts of human rights documents that prevents the simultaneous application of both to preliminary actions for the use of force. Additionally, a serious contradiction and concern arises as to why the system of resorting to force should be considered beyond the reach and applicability of international human rights law precisely when the destructive capacity of military force is at its highest. Various theories have been put forward in this regard.

The third objection concerns the exclusive competence of the Security Council and the lack of authority of human rights bodies to make decisions on issues related to aggression and the use of force. In response, it has been pointed out that there is no provision in the United Nations Charter that affirms the exclusive competence of the UN Security Council to determine and ascertain the occurrence of aggression. According to the resolutions of the Kampala Conference, the powers of the Security Council regarding the crime of aggression have not been broader than its powers concerning other international crimes. Thus, for all three objections mentioned, robust legal responses have been provided.

Although the approach reflected in General Comment No. 36 and the comprehensive efforts within the doctrine and practices of human rights bodies to limit state sovereignty in the face of the right to life is seen as a promising step towards enhancing the status of fundamental human rights, particularly the right to life, in the international community, there is still a significant distance to reach an ideal point. In fact, given the inherent nature of the interstate concept of aggression, some legal scholars believe that accepting the link between the right to life and the rights related to war as an accurate reflection of existing rights is somewhat difficult. Moreover, the legal implications and consequences of this approach in the Committee's General Comment No. 36 may conflict with the interests of certain states, especially western states.