مجله حقوقی بین المللی

مجله حقوقی بین المللی

مسوولیت کیفری برای تخریب زیر ساختهای غیرنظامی در مخاصمات مسلحانه: پر کردن خلا بین حقوق بین‌المللی بشردوستانه و حقوق بین‌المللی کیفری

نوع مقاله : پژوهشی

نویسنده
گروه حقوق بین الملل، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی واحد تهران مرکزی
10.22066/cilamag.2026.2087907.2883
چکیده
این پژوهش به مسئولیت کیفری ناشی از تخریب زیرساخت‌های غیرنظامی در مخاصمات مسلحانه می‌پردازد. سؤال اصلی آن است که در چه شرایطی حملات علیه زیرساخت‌های حیاتی، به‌ویژه اهداف دوگانه، می‌تواند به احراز عنصر معنوی و در نتیجه مسئولیت کیفری فردی منجر شود؟ فرضیه تحقیق بر این مبنا استوار است که محدودیت‌های اثباتی و پراکندگی مقررات و نظریات تفسیری و قضایی میان حقوق بشردوستانه بین‌المللی و حقوق بین‌المللی کیفری، مانع تحقق مؤثر پاسخگویی کیفری است، اما برخی قرائن بیرونی—از جمله اظهارات مقامات سیاسی مانند تهدیدات منتسب به دونالد ترامپ درباره هدف قرار دادن زیرساخت‌ها—می‌تواند در احراز قصد یا علم مرتکب نقش تقویتی ایفا کند. روش تحقیق توصیفی-تحلیلی و مبتنی بر معاهدات، رویه قضایی و دکترین است. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد که با پذیرش اماره ماهیت غیرنظامی زیرساخت‌ها و الزام به توجیه ضرورت نظامی، می‌توان ارزیابی ادله و احراز عنصر معنوی را تقویت نمود.
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات

عنوان مقاله English

Criminal Responsibility for the Destruction of Civilian Infrastructure in Armed Conflicts: Bridging Gaps between International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law

نویسنده English

Sadegh Salimi
Int'l law Department, Law Faculty, Tehran Central Branch, Islamic Azad University,Tehran, Iran
چکیده English

The destruction of civilian infrastructure has become a defining feature of contemporary armed conflicts, raising complex questions at the intersection of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL), and International Criminal Law (ICL). This article examines the legal implications of attacks against critical infrastructure, particularly dual-use objects, and argues that existing legal frameworks suffer from doctrinal fragmentation and evidentiary limitations. While IHL establishes a robust regime based on distinction, proportionality, and precaution, ICL translates only a limited subset of violations into individual criminal responsibility, thereby creating a structural gap in accountability.

Against this background, the article critically engages with contemporary state practice, including public statements attributed to Donald J. Trump concerning the targeting of infrastructure, assessing their compatibility with international legal standards. It argues that such statements, particularly when endorsing attacks on objects indispensable to civilian life, may serve as contextual evidence contributing to the inference of mens rea (intent or knowledge) in the assessment of potential war crimes.

Building on treaty law, jurisprudence, and scholarly analysis, the article advances a doctrinal refinement: a rebuttable presumption of civilian use in relation to critical infrastructure, combined with an evidentiary expectation that the attacking party substantiate claims of military necessity. This approach does not alter the burden of proof under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court but recalibrates evidentiary assessment in light of informational asymmetries.

The article concludes that this framework enhances coherence between IHL and ICL and strengthens the effectiveness of criminal accountability while better reflecting the humanitarian realities of modern warfare.Keywords:

International Humanitarian Law; International Criminal Law; Civilian Infrastructure; War Crimes; Dual-Use Objects; Proportionality; Military Objectives; Human Rights; Evidentiary Standards

1. Introduction

The destruction of civilian infrastructure has become a defining feature of contemporary armed conflicts, particularly in urbanized battlefields where the interdependence of civilian life and critical systems is most pronounced. Attacks against electricity grids, water supply systems, transportation networks, and healthcare facilities generate not only immediate harm but also long-term humanitarian consequences that may persist well beyond the cessation of hostilities. In this context, civilian infrastructure is no longer merely collateral to military operations; rather, it occupies a central place in both military strategy and humanitarian concern. Recent state practice further illustrates this trend. In April 2026, the United States openly acknowledged targeting a major bridge in Iran, while its President warned that additional strikes against infrastructure, including power facilities, could follow. Such statements, which explicitly frame civilian infrastructure as a strategic target, underscore the urgency of reassessing the adequacy of existing legal protections.

International humanitarian law (IHL) provides the primary normative framework governing the protection of civilian objects during armed conflict. At its core are the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution, which collectively seek to limit the effects of hostilities on civilian populations and objects. The principle of distinction requires parties to a conflict to direct their operations only against military objectives, while proportionality prohibits attacks expected to cause incidental civilian harm excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. These rules are firmly embedded in both treaty law and customary international law, reflecting their fundamental status within the law of armed conflict. Moreover, as emphasized by Jamshid Momtaz, the protection afforded to civilians during armed conflict cannot be understood solely within the confines of IHL, but must also be read in light of continuing human rights obligations, particularly where attacks on infrastructure directly affect access to essential services such as water, electricity, and healthcare.

Despite this clear normative framework, the application of IHL to modern conflicts has become increasingly complex. One of the most significant challenges arises from the widespread use of so-called “dual-use” objects—facilities that allegedly serve both civilian and military purposes. As noted by Marco Sassòli, the classification of such objects as military objectives depends on their effective contribution to military action and the definite military advantage anticipated from their destruction, a determination that is often highly context-dependent and subject to interpretation. This ambiguity creates substantial legal uncertainty, particularly when critical infrastructure is targeted on the basis of indirect or speculative military utility. In practice, the invocation of “dual-use” status has frequently been relied upon to justify attacks on objects whose primary function remains civilian, thereby blurring the line between lawful targeting and prohibited conduct.

Parallel to the development of IHL, international criminal law (ICL) has established mechanisms for individual accountability for serious violations of the laws and customs of war. The International Criminal Court criminalizes, inter alia, intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects that are not military objectives. However, the threshold for criminal responsibility is significantly higher than that required to establish a violation of IHL. As emphasized by William A. Schabas, the prosecution must demonstrate not only the objective unlawfulness of the attack but also the perpetrator’s intent and knowledge with respect to the civilian character of the object. This evidentiary burden has limited the practical enforcement of criminal accountability in cases involving the destruction of infrastructure. Where political or military leaders publicly acknowledge or threaten attacks against infrastructure, such statements may constitute relevant evidence in establishing intent (mens rea), yet such evidence has rarely been systematically utilized in international prosecutions.

The gap between the protective norms of IHL and the enforcement mechanisms of ICL becomes particularly evident in contemporary conflicts, where large-scale destruction of infrastructure has been widely documented but rarely prosecuted as a war crime. While such acts may raise serious concerns under the principles of proportionality and necessity, their legal qualification often hinges on contested factual assessments regarding military advantage and the dual-use nature of the targeted objects. This raises a fundamental question as to whether the current framework of international law is capable of effectively attributing criminal responsibility for the destruction of civilian infrastructure, or whether doctrinal ambiguity and evidentiary constraints have rendered such accountability largely ineffective in practice. The persistence of this gap risks normalizing attacks on infrastructure as a permissible instrument of warfare, thereby undermining both humanitarian protections and the credibility of international criminal justice.

Against this background, this article argues that although international law provides a normative basis for the protection of civilian infrastructure, it fails to offer a sufficiently coherent framework for attributing criminal responsibility in practice. More specifically, it advances the argument that civilian infrastructure should be presumed to retain its civilian character, and that the burden rests on the attacking party to demonstrate, through credible and verifiable evidence, that the targeted object constituted a lawful military objective at the time of the attack. By examining the interaction between IHL and ICL, with particular emphasis on the treatment of dual-use objects and the evidentiary requirements of criminal prosecution, this study seeks to identify the structural limitations of the current legal regime and to propose avenues for its doctrinal and practical refinement. In doing so, it aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on strengthening accountability for the destruction of infrastructure and preventing the erosion of fundamental humanitarian norms in contemporary armed conflict.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

International Humanitarian Law
International Criminal Law
Civilian Infrastructure
War Crimes
Dual-Use Objects
Proportionality
Human Rights

مقالات آماده انتشار، پذیرفته شده
انتشار آنلاین از 26 مرداد 1405

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