The Strait of Hormuz, as the waterway connecting the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, has been subject to the sovereignty of various powers throughout contemporary history. The first foreign sovereignty in this region belonged to Portugal, followed by England, and after a brief period of Dutch sovereignty, England once again exercised its dominance. Following the agreement between England and the United States and the implementation of the "CENTO" plan, Iran was appointed as the regional gendarme, and after the Islamic Revolution, the strait came under the control of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hormuz is located in the "Rimland" – the maritime fringe of the Eurasian landmass – which in Spykman's theory holds greater significance than the "Heartland." In the view of Alfonso de Albuquerque, the Portuguese navigator, addressing the King of Portugal: "If the world were a ring, Hormuz would be its jewel." The importance of the Strait of Hormuz is such that Marco Rubio, the US Secretary of State, referred to it as an "economic nuclear weapon." The Strait of Hormuz hosts approximately 65% of the world's total oil reserves, and 38% of the world's crude oil, 18% of the world's petroleum products, and approximately 97% of the oil of the Persian Gulf states transit this strait. Additionally, about 30% of the world's required fertilizer transits this strait. For this reason, Hormuz can be considered the vital artery of global energy. On September 22, 1980, simultaneous with Western support for Iraq's invasion of Iran, the scope of war quickly extended to the Persian Gulf, making this sensitive and strategic region the scene of the Tanker War. The US-Israeli attack against Iran on December 29, 2025, once again inflicted pain upon this beating heart of West Asia, and this time led to the blockage of the world's economic lifeline in the Strait of Hormuz. Military control over this region – coupled with the outrage over the martyrdom of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution and the massacre of children at the Minab School in Hormozgan – became intertwined with strategic patience in managing the Strait of Hormuz. To design this new management system, it is essential to re-examine the capacities of international law to ensure the equitable flow of oil through the artery of the Strait of Hormuz and to guarantee the security of this fragile region. The significance of international navigation has necessitated the creation of restrictive approaches within international law regarding the sovereignty of coastal states over international straits. When the 1982 Convention provided for transit passage through straits such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Islamic Republic of Iran refrained from ratifying it and has protested this rule on various occasions, including through letters registered with the United Nations and statements by officials. With the escalation of political and security tensions against Iran, including threats of oil embargoes, Iranian officials repeatedly threatened to impose restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz. Although threats of oil embargoes in 2012 and 2018 by the European Union and the United States were implemented, the Strait of Hormuz was never closed. With the onset of the third imposed war by the United States and Israel against Iran in 2026, concurrent with Iran's exercise of legitimate self-defense against Israel and US bases in the region, Iran took action to impose control over the Strait of Hormuz. This control, which the Leader of Iran's Islamic Revolution termed the "new management of the Strait of Hormuz," entails a legal framework that has been accompanied by various pronouncements. The sum of official pronouncements can be summarized in four claims: prohibition of passage, imposition of transit tolls, collection of fees for services, and receipt of compensation from vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. Hence, this fundamental question arises: given the American-Zionist war against Iran, to what extent does the newly declared and implemented regime on the Strait of Hormuz, during and after the war, comply with international law? Therefore, the hypothesis that "there are numerous capacities in international law supporting Iran's actions and claims in managing the Strait of Hormuz during and after the war" is examined. The legal status of straits in international law and the legal status of the Strait of Hormuz prior to the American-Zionist war are reviewed as an introduction. The research is conducted based on a logical-deductive analysis in examining international documents and an inductive analysis in examining the international practice of states. The application of the innocent passage regime in Iran's territorial sea within the Strait of Hormuz enjoys serious legal justifications. It has been established that during hostilities, it is possible to "prohibit the passage of belligerent vessels" and "restrict the passage of neutral vessels" on the Iranian side. Furthermore, it is possible to take military action "in the vicinity of Iranian naval operations" and to attack violating vessels within a "Prohibited/Dangerous Zone" on the Omani side. This latter case is formulated based on Oman's departure from neutrality or the transformation of Omani waters into a war zone. The passage of "unauthorized military vessels" through the Strait of Hormuz has already been prohibited under Iran's Maritime Areas Law, and the passage of "vessels engaged in non-innocent passage" is prohibited under the 1982 Convention. However, the imposition of "transit tolls" on vessels – if not defensible on grounds of fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus), a specific regional custom, or necessity – is more defensible with respect to tolls on "ship cargoes" and "submarine cables." The collection of "service fees," with an emphasis on the specific cost of "providing security," is possible from all vessels, and grounds appear to exist for receiving "compensation" from vessels associated with debtor states, based on countermeasures or the enforcement of judicial rulings. For this purpose, the Supreme National Security Council must compile a "list of debtor states" and the method of installment payments, and appropriate judicial rulings must be issued. Furthermore, it is necessary to define and update the list of "belligerent and quasi-belligerent states and groups" and the "definition of war zones" to thereby enable enforcement actions in Oman's territorial sea. Pursuing the conclusion of "bilateral agreements" to provide services in accordance with Article 43 of the 1982 Convention, and the conclusion of an "international convention" under Article 35 of the 1982 Convention or outside its framework – similar to what the United States did regarding the common heritage of mankind in the 1994 New York Agreement after the 1982 Convention entered into force – with interested states, and efforts to designate the Strait of Hormuz as a "Particularly Sensitive Sea Area" within the International Maritime Organization, and to approve a "new Traffic Separation Scheme" in cooperation with Oman, would largely guarantee the implementation of Iran's decisions. Additionally, proposals such as establishing the "Hormuz Insurance Fund," the "Hormuz Commodity Exchange," and launching the "Hormuz Currency" for financial settlements could provide sufficient incentives for the two coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz in the "new management of the Strait of Hormuz." Appropriate exemptions for membership in the Insurance Fund and the Hormuz Commodity Exchange, as well as "non-dollar transactions" and greater exemptions for Rial-based transactions, would create the necessary incentives for vessels.